Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do appreciate the

opportunity for us to spend some time reflecting on the North Korean

situation.

I heard my friend from California refer to his problems with the

approach of the Clinton Administration, which I think they would

admit was the best of a series of unpalatable alternatives, but it

is not clear at all that the approach of this Administration has

been any more effective at all.

We have no inspectors. We have more hostility. They are still

dealing with terrorists. I find great irony that all of the justifications

that were mustered to deal with an attack against Iraq were

even stronger against North Korea.

North Korea has, in all probability, weapons of mass destruction.

They were dealing with terrorists. Where Saddam Hussein had

gassed and killed thousands of his people, this Korean Government

has deliberately starved 2 million of their people, slave labor, the

things that have been referenced here before, and it wasn’t lost on

the North Koreans that these justifications are there.

Now we are stretched very thin, $300 billion later in Iraq. Our

troops are frayed. If hostilities were to break out on the Korean Peninsula,

we would be hard pressed. And if it were to involve nuclear

weapons, it would be troubling indeed.

But I must confess that this is an area where I welcome the discussion.

It is not clear to me at this point what better alternatives

there are. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.

I do think, however, that the solution of engagement that has

been pursued by the South Koreans, the Sunshine Policy, is not

something that I think we should be dismissing.

I think it shows great courage on the part of some of their officials

and I think ultimately some variation of that has to be a part

of an ultimate solution that brings North Korea back from the

abyss to which they have reached.

I will fight myself, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I must say that I

found Mr. Eberstadt’s analysis very interesting, in terms of how

you portrayed the approach of the North Koreans, the role that its

nuclear capacity played and its continuing state.

It is to be very useful. I appreciated the clarity with which you

expressed your assessment and I do think that is a very useful

mindset to approach this question.

The hearing is late. You have given us a great amount of material

to digest. Each of you has more than you have put forth, and

I will spend some time on the plane riding home this afternoon

kind of going over it, but I would like to just refer to the last paragraph,

Mr. Wolfsthal.

You didn’t elaborate, you didn’t mention your conclusion that we

should be concerned that Iran is taking its clues from the situation

with North Korea and its nuclear capacity. I was curious if you

wanted to elaborate on that briefly.

And Mr. Eberstadt, just given your mindset, you may be steering

a little bit from your area of expertise, but if you had some

thoughts as well about the implications of this adventure with

North Korea on what is going on in Iran and what we can do.

If that would be all right, Mr. Chairman? It is a little——

Thank you.

Mr. Eberstadt, do you have a thought?

Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.